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I \TRODUCTION
There are seven billion people in the world, and they all
need food.' But, despite a swiftly growing population, the land
available for crop production and animal grazing is finite.2 As
the amount of open land decreases and demand for crops
increases, rural, fertile land is becoming an increasingly rare
asset. , Rising global demand and a lack of domestic capital from
private and governmental sources make foreign direct
investment ("FDI") necessary to sufficiently cultivate rural areas
in developing nations.4 Additionally, these foreign investments
have the potential to reap high returns for investors.5 Currently,
the most attractive areas for agricultural land investment are in
South America and sub-Saharan Africa.6 Countries such as
1. See (.S. & 11World Popaai'tio Clocks, U.S. CENSUS 1i UREAU (Mar. 18, 2012, 5:15
PM), http:,/ww.census.gov/main/wiv /popclock.html (indicating that the current
world population is over seven billion people).
2. See id.: see also Michael Kugelman. Introduction. in LAND (GRAB THE RACE FOR
THE WORLD'S FARMLAND 1, 14 (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. Levenstein eds., 2009)
(noting that the world's population is estimated to rise to nine billion by 2050); Press
Release, U.N. Population Div., World Population Will Increase by 2.5 Billion by 2050;
People over 60 to Increase by More than I Billion. U.N. Press Release POP/952 (Mar.
13, 2007) (estimating world population to reach 9.2 billion by 2050).
3. See Kugelman, supra note 2, at 14 (establishing that while demand for lood is
rising, the supply of land is limited).
4. See Alexandra Spieldoch & Sophia Murphy, Agbilaral Lard Acq isitior s
Implications for Food Security and Poverty Alleviation, in LAND (GRAB THE P-RACE FOR THE
WORLD'S F.ARMLAND 39 (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. Levenstein eds., 2009) (noting
a "strong agreement among policyrnakers that more investment in agriculture is
urgently needed"); see also Howard Mann & Carin Smaller, Foreign Land Purchases for
Agriculture: What Impat on Sustainable Development?. SUSTAINABLE DEV. INNOVATION
BRIEFS, no. 8, Jan. 2010, at 7 (discussing how more foreign investment is needed to
develop and support the global agricultural industry).
5. See Horand Knaup & Juliane von Mittlstaedt, The Ne Coloialisot: Foreig
I vestors Snap Vp African Farmiard, SPIEGEL ONLINE INT'L (luly 30, 2009),
http://ww .spiegel.de/interinational/world/0,1518.639224,00.hnlil (reasoning that a
"combination of more people and less land makes food a sate investment," and that
investors are looking at annual returns olftwenty to thirty percent); Olivier )e Schutter,
The Green Rush: The Global Racefor Fmlarnd and the Rights of Land Users, 52 HARV. INT'l
L. 503, 516 (2011) (discussing how, due to recent supply and demand ratios.
agricultural investments have the potential to be highly profitable).
6. See MATTLS GORGLN ET AL., FED. MINISTRY FOR EcoN. COOPERATION & DEV.,
FOREIGN DIRECT INVEST\IENT (FD1) IN LAND IN DEVELOPING COUNTRILS 8, 11 (2009)
(discussing how an increasing number of investors are acquiring rural land in Atfrica.
South and Central America, and Southeast Asia); see also David Hallamn, International
Investments in Agricultural Production, in LAND GRAB? THE RAGL FOR THE WORLDS
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Angola, Argentina, Brazil, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Sudan have immense tracks of undeveloped, arable
soil capable of supporting large-scale agriculture.7 While the sub-
Saharan region remains almost entirely unregulated, some
South American countries have started to place restrictions on
foreign access to rural lands."
This Note analyzes various factors affecting foreign
investment in Brazilian rural lands, focusing specifically on an
opinion recently issued by the Brazilian Attorney General
("AGU"), the individual charged with interpreting Brazilian law,
concerning restrictions on foreign land acquisition. 9 Part I
provides an overview of the structure of international land
agreements and the public and private actors involved in these
deals, highlighting the factors that affect Brazil's investment
climate. Part 11 introduces Brazilian Law 5.709 ("Law 5.709"),
which governs all rural land acquisitions in Brazil by non-
nationals. Part II then considers a 2010 AGU opinion that re-
interprets Law 5.709, extending restrictions on foreign
acquisition of rural lands to Brazilian companies owned by a
FARMIAN) 27, 30 (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. ILevenstein eds., 2009) (listing Africa
and Brazil as two "main targets of investment").
7. See (ORGLN ET AL., supra note 6, at 11 (establishing that ninety percent of the
global land potentially available fbr cultivation is located in South America and sub-
Saharan Afica, with fifty percent of this land spread across just seven countries,
including Brazil).
8. See, e.g., Kugelmnan, supra note 2, at 10 (pointing out the eagerness of the
Ethiopian government to transfer land to developers, based on the mere promise they
will improve agricultural productivity and development); (GORGLN LT AL., supra note 6,
at 15 (classiting sub-Saharan Africa as a region with little information about the
availability and ownership of land, weak governance, and a tendency for political
disurbance and corruption). Cf jeremy Bowden, Fanniar d-Tightening of Foreigr
Ownership Rules, WORLDCROPS.GOM (Sept. 21, 2011), httpi/ww.worldcrops.com/
8704-farimland-tightening of-foreign-ownership-rules (discussing the new legal limits
on foreign ownership and leasing being developed and implemented in Argentina,
Brazil, and Uruguay).
9. The Brazilian Attorney General ("AGU") is responsible for providing an official
interpretation of the Brazilian Constitution, laws, statutes, and administrative acts. See
Walter Stuber & Adriana Maria Godel Stuber, The Acquisition of Brazilian Rural Land by
Foreignmers. .. INT'L BANKING L. & RLG. N131, N132 (2010); see also Big Crackdown on
Foreigr Fi ms' Land Ownership, MORNING STAR (London) (Aug. 25, 2010),
http://ww.moirningstaronline.co.uk/news/content/view/full/94474 (noting that
Brazilian Attorney General Luis Inacio Lucena Adams issued the 2010 opinion).
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majority nondomestic capital."' Part III considers this
interpretation and outlines the negative effects of a general ban
on land acquisitions by non-Brazilian nationals. This Part argues
that Law 5.709 should be repealed in its entirety and replaced
with new legislation that allows for large-scale foreign land
acquisitions, while increasing transactional transparency and
party accountability. Finally, Part III contends that new
legislation will address Brazil's primary concerns, namely
national security and economic viability, while fostering needed
international participation in the rural land markets.
I. THE RECENT RISE OFAGRICULTURAL IN VESTMENT AND
BRAiZIL 'S POTENIAL AS AN IN'DUSTRY LEADER
Agricultural land and food-producing resources have
recently become important assets, triggering a surge in both
private and public investment. This Part examines the sudden
interest in agriculture and explains why Brazil is a particularly
important case study. It begins by exploring the recent trends in
rural land investment and explains why investors are
increasingly receptive to the prospect of overseas land
acquisition. Part L.A considers the various forms these
acquisitions can take and the frequent preference for titled
ownership over looser arrangements, such as short-term leasing
or contract growing. Part LB scrutinizes different sources of
investment, from private sector involvement, to investment by
sovereign wealth funds. Next, Part I.C describes the particular
climate in Brazil for FDI, taking into consideration the country's
transition to a democratic form of government, its movement
away from protectionism, and its increased openness to
international investment. Finally, Part LD outlines the
geopolitical risk factors that figure most prominently in large
Brazilian land deals, describing considerations for both host
countries and investors.
10. See Lei No. 5.709, art. 5(1), de 7 de Outubro de 1971, DIARIO Oi'CIAL DA
UNLO [D.O.U.] de 7.10.1971 (Braz.) (governing toreign land acquisition and leasing
in Brazil).
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The recent increase in demand for food and biofuels has
put a strain on the international supply of crops 1 In 2008,
world food prices rose dramatically, and the high cost of food
staples, such as grain and edible oils, caused riots across the
globe.12 The price spikes hit developing and food-importing
countries especially hard, leading many of these countries to
reconsider their food security policies. , The UN Food and
Agriculture Organization recently estimated that an additional
120 million hectares of land must be allocated for agricultural
production worldwide in order to support the required
additional growth in food production by 2030. 14
Currently, the global community is only using around
thirty-six percent of available land for crop production, leaving
over 2.7 billion hectares undeveloped.1 5 There is consensus in
11. See SHEPARD DANIEL & ANULRADHA MITTA , THE OAKLAND INST.. THE GREAT
LAND GRAB: RUSH FOR WORLD'S FAR-MLAND THREATLNS FOOD SECURITY FOR THE POOR
4 (2009) (discussing the United States' goal to "increase ethanol use by 3.5 billion
gallons between 2005 and 2012," and the European Union's goal to use biofucls in ten
percent of land transportation by 2020); see also Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 4, at
39 (positing that the increased global interest in biofiels feedstock makes investing in
agricultural land a good choice).
12. See Kugelman, supra note 2, at 2 (citing the 2008 peak in world food prices);
Editorial, The World Food Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2008, at A26 (recognizing the
record high prices of corn and wheat, and the potential for thirttdree countries to
experience social unrest as a result).
13. See Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 2 (discussing how countris that depend
on food imports were heavily impacted by the export bans imposed by at least twenty-
five food-exporting countries in 2008); see also G(ORGEN LT AL., ,,ra note 6. at 13
(citing the 2008 food crisis as the impetus for countries that rely heavily on food
imports to diversify their food sources and begin producing their own food abroad).
14. See About F40, FOOD & AGrIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
http://wwxfao.org/about/cn (last visited May 8, 2012) (noting the Food and
Agriculture Organization is a UN specialized agency with a mandate to promote
worldwide lood security) ;see also FOOD & AGRIC. ORG.. WORLD AGRICULTURE: TosvARDS
2015/2030 3 (Jelle Bruinsma ed., 2002) (predicting that 120 million hectares of arable
land will be put to use in developing countries by 2030); De Schuttcr, supra note 5, at
519 (citing the Food and Agriculture Organization's finding that 120 million hectares
nust be put into production to support future food nceds). Cf How to Feed 2 Billion
!Wore VMouths in 2030? Here Are Some Answers. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, http:// N w.fao.org/cnglish/newsroom/news/2002/8280-en.hLml (last
visited Oct. 21, 2012) (outlining obstacles and solutions foir teding a growing
population).
15. See GORGEN LT AL., supra note 6, at 10 (noting that of a total land surface of
13.4 billion hectares, 4.5 billion hectares is potentially appropriate for crop
production). But c. Gary R. Blumenthal. Investors' Perspectives on Farnland, in LAND
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the international community that public investment alone is
insufficient, and that private investment is necessary to meet
future food demands. 16 The percentage of public funds
dedicated to agriculture in most developing countries has
remained consistently low because of a lack of available capital. 7
In the past, private investors often chose not to invest in
agriculture because of the social and political sensitivities roused
by rural land use and food production policies.1 8 Recently
however, certain economic factors have made agricultural
investment more appealing, and many investors are choosing to
overlook these historical concerns to acquire rural lands. l
GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORI )'S FARMHAND 55, 59-60 (Michael Kugelnan & Susan
L. Levenstein eds., 2009) (discussing how only ten to thirteen percent of the world's
land is considered arable).
16. See Blumenthal. supra note 15, at 58 (discussing a 2009 meeting where the
Group of Eight ("G8") agriculture ninisters called for both public and private
investment in agriculture); see also Hallam, supra note 6, at 28 (discussing how a lack of
investment led to ineificient, under-producing agricultural areas and contributed to
the 2008 food crisis); (ORLEN ET AL.. supra note 6, at 8 (observing that longstanding
low investment in agriculture in developing countries has dampened productivity and
production levels across that sector).
17. See U.N. 'World Stunnit on Food Sec.. Roine, It., Nov. 16-18, 2009, Foreigni
Direct In estm rt--17r-iA'n or Land Grab? [hereinafter 1,7n- Win or Land G-r,?]
(observing that on average, developing countries have decreased their level of public
spending in agriculture to around seven percent); see also GORGEN ET AL., supra note 6,
at 8 (discussing the inadequacy of public finds and developmental aid in the
agricultural sector).
18. See Carl Atkin, Investment ifai rland and Farming in Central and Eastern Europe
and the Former Soviet UInion- C ,rt Trds and Issues, in IAND (GRABP, THL RACL FOR
THE X\ORID'S FARMIUAND 109, 110 (Michael Kugehnan & Susan L Levenstein eds.,
2009) (classitfing land as an "emotive asset class," one that has historically evoked
strong emotions from people); Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 55 (discussing how
investors have traditionally shied away fhorn the agricultural sector because the vast
agricultural labor force mnakes it a socially and politically sensitive issue). Bt cf
Anastasia Telesetsky, Resource Cou nijs over Arable Land in Food J1nsecure States Creting an
United Nations Ombudsman Institution to Review Foreign7 Agricultural Land Leases, 3
GOETTNGL.NJ. INTL L. 283, 287 (2011) (drawing an unflattcring parallel between large
modern land purchases and the oppressive colonial plantations of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries).
19. See Kay McDonald, I7" Investing in International Farmland Can be Perilous. BUS.
INSU)LR (une 14, 2011), htp://articles.businessinsider.comi/2011-06-14/markcts/
30028372_1tarimland-sovereigin-wealth-fundsi-freign-owniership (assessing that the
arnount of private capital in agricultural farmland is expected to rise fhon USS2.5-3
billion to US$5-7 billion over the next several years); Himani Sari ar, AgriL ale Private
Investment Seen Doubling in Two Years, RLUTERS. Apr. 24, 2011, available at
http: //www. reuters.con /ar ticle/2011/04/ 25/ us-agriculture-investment -interview-
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A number of factors are currently creating a favorable
environment for investment in agriculture. First, domestic
governments cannot sufficiently fund adequate development of
the agricultural sector, creating a greater need and opportunity
for private investment. 20 Second, investment in agricultural land,
unlike other sectors, has been considered "recession proof'
because food expenditures are relatively inelastic and are thus
insulated from market fluctuations.21 Third, a growing global
population and recent biofuel innovations are together creating
increased demand for food crops2 2 These factors ensure that
the crop market will continue to expand.23 Fourth, due to the
gradual removal of trade barriers, individuals can more easily
manipulate production and supply bases to benefit from tariff
and trade incentives.2 4 Finally, as a commodity, land has unique
attributes that make it attractive for investors: it acts as an
idUSTRE73001320110425 (discussing how private investment in agriculture is
predicted to double in two years). But cf McDonald, supra note 19, at 2 (discussing
estimates that pcg the total value of investnent funds in agriculturc at fifteen to twenty
billion dollars).
20. See Win Win or Land Grab?. supra note 17, at I (finding that developing
counltrics' abilities to sufficiently fund their own agricultural progriams are limited); see
also GORGEN LT AL.. supra note 6, at 8 (highlighting that underinvestment in the
agricultural sector stretches back decades). But ef I)ANIEI & MIFTAL, supra note 11, at
6-7 (discussing the goal of the International Financial Corporation to meet growing
food needs by facilitating private entry into foreign land markets).
21. See Kugchnan, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that investors see agriculture as a
safe invesnent, largely because staple products such as food are not greatly affected in
economic downturns). Bt (cJ. (ORGEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 15 (listing the factors that
make land investment an attractive investment fbr state-backed and private
enterprises).
22. (ORGEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (identifying that the increased desire for
land stns from a rising demand tor food and a simultaneous need for biomass tor
industrial and energy purposes); DANILL & MITT., supra note 11, at 5 (outlining some
of the sources for investor interest in agriculture, including a strong food demand in
emerging countries and the new demand tor bioproducts).
23. See DANILL & MITTAL supra note 11, at 5 (atributing the 2007 shift i-om
"soft" commodities to "hard" ones to the growing desire for bioproducts and the high
demand in emerging economics): see also xnaup & von Mittelstaedt, supa note 5
(noting that the "combination of more people and less land" will always make food a
"safe investment").
24. See Raul Q. Montemayor, Overseas Farmland Investments-Boon or Bane for
Farmers in Asia ?. in LAND GRKAB? THL RACE FOR THL VOPRLD'S FAIRMLAND 95, 96 (Michael
Kugelman & Susan I. Levenstein eds., 2009) (discussing how the removal of
international trade and investment barriers permits a company to choose its supply and
production bases suategically).
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inflation hedge, provides income, and is not hindered bv a
correlation to other investments.25
A. Djferent Structures of International Land Deals
Foreign investment in agricultural land can take various
forms. 26 One of the most common forms involves an overseas
investor leasing land from a private or public entity in the host
country.2 7 Leasing creates greater flexibility for both parties
because there is no permanent commitment, and both parties
can address specific concerns contractually.28 Leases often afford
a host country more control over the land than it would have if
the investor had made an outright purchase. 2 - Leases, however,
do not provide the investor with the same security as ownership,
since the lessor does not hold legal title."," Additionally, short-
term leases rarely align the lessor's interests with the long-term
sustainability of the land.3
25. See Atkin, supra note 18. at 109 (describing tactors coinnion to both
agricultural land and generic real estate); see also Mauta Badkar, 5 Reasons !,t ,,o s A or
Goiag Crazy for Farn/and. BLS. INSIDER (Feb. 14, 2011),
http:/iww .businessinsider.coin /ivest-in-farnland-2011 -2? (describing how larmland
investment requires a long-term commitment). But cf Atkin, spra note 18, at 10
(positing that land investments are illiquid in nature, often requiring a minimum
commitment of ten years, and that the lack of transparency and wealth of restrictions
on ownership and occupation often make rural land in developing countries difficult
to valuate).
26. See 14i 7r-4i7n or Land Grab , supra note 17. at 2-3 (discussing the various mcans
of capital investment in agriculture, including leasing, purchasing, contract farming,
and out-grower schemes).
27. See id. at 1 (noting that leasing is one of the main vehicles for investing in
agricultural land).
28. See Ruth Meinzen -Dick & Helen Markelova, Necessary Nmaaee: Toward a Code of
Conduct in Foreigw Land Deals, in IAND GRAB? THE RACE FOR THE WORLD'S FKRMIILAND.
supra 69, 78 (Michael Kugelman & Susan L. Levenstein eds., 2009) (describing leases as
reversible," as opposed to sales. which are permanent).
29. See id. (discussing how leases allow foir potential changes to the agreceient,
while a sale is definitive); see also Telesetsky, supra note 18, at 288 (recognizing that
foireign investors can insert specific guarantees in land agreements to counteract the
power of the host countries).
30. See Hallam, supra note 6. at 31 (asserting that titled ownership is considered
the most secure forin of ownership).
31. See Meinzen)Dick & Markelova, supra note 28, at 78; see also Najma Sadcque,
Giviag Away the Family Silver, NLWSLINE (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://wwx.nwslinemagazinc.com/2009/10/giving-away-the-tamily-silver (analyzing
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Host countries have taken various approaches to leasing-
from incentivizing investors with attractive guarantees to
controlling the specific areas of land available to international
investors. On one end of the spectrum, Pakistan recently offered
ninety-nine year leases with full rights of repatriation and no
special conditions should a food shortage occur. In addition, it
included a 100,000-person security force to protect the
international investment."2z In contrast, some Asian governments
have chosen to exert more oversight over the investments by
preselecting the land they wished to make available to foreigners
and then requiring investors to go through state agencies to
formulate the land agreements.13 Some countries have adopted
leasing as the sole means by which a foreign entity can obtain
rural agricultural lands.34
Alternatively, investors that purchase land gain a greater
degree of certainty and stability in the asset. Acquiring land
affixes the investor's name on the deed and garners her
substantial protections based in property ownership law.s. A
titled owner has greater control over how she elects to use the
land, and retains alienability rights for purposes of future asset
transfers 3 6 Moreover, land purchase incentivizes the owner to
how value of the leased land can decrease substantially because of overuse or improper
use, rendering "ownership" virtually meaningless).
32. See Sadeque, supra note 31 (discussing how Pakistan is offering attractive rural
land packages to hre investors); Telesetsky, supra note 18, at 288-89 (examining
Pakistan's ninety-nine year leases).
33. See Montemayor, supra note 24, at 99 (discussing the trend among Asian
governments to transfer ownership of large plots of public land to state agencies, which
in turn lease thre land to foreign entities); see also Economic Land Concessions, OPEN DIEV.,
http://wNw .opendevelopietraibodia.ne t/briefings/economic-land-co cessions
(last visited Aug. 25, 2012) (explaining the system in Cambodia whereby a government
agency issues economic land concessions, essentially long terin leases, for agricultural
production of specific areas).
34. See Xiaojing Qin, Foreignes' Right to Acquire Land Under Internatonal Economic
Agreements, 8 MANCHESTERJ. INT'I ECON. I. 57, 66 (2011) (listing the seven countries
that require foreign entities and persons to acquire land through leasing alone:
Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Hong Kong, Madagascar, O(man, and Tonga).
35. See Hallam, supra note 6, at 31 (positing that the current interest in land
acquisition sterns fiom the association of asset ownership with security).
36. See GORGEN LT AL., supra note 6, at 12 (suggesting that private investors will
benefit fi-om increasing land prices by purchasing land now. rather than having to lease
it in tihe future); see also Hallam, supra note 6, at 35 (examining how purchasing is most
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take care of the property and maintain the value of the
investment, brings needed revenue to the underfunded area of
agriculture, and enables technology transfer by introducing new
methods and means of production. 37
Agricultural investments can also take the form of a joint
venture or contract grower scheme, which are looser contractual
arrangements than leasing and ownership. 8 Because a joint
venture involves aligning with a local partner, it can facilitate
land access and open the doors to possible domestic benefits for
the partnership. 39 Ajoint venture agreement, however, requires
the investor to share control and profits from the leased land
with the local partner, which can detract from the
arrangement's overall appeal.40 In a contract grower scenario,
the investor enters into a series of individual contracts with local
farmers who then agree to farm the land and turn over crops
according to the investor's specifications. <4  This type of
agreement allows the investor to avoid labor costs and does not
require her to commit to a non-liquid asset; however, the
investor forfeits a degree of control over the crops and does not
appealing where econones of scale are significant or the investment requires large
infrastructure commitments).
37. See Mcinzen-Dick & Markelova, supra note 28, at 72 (citing evidence that
foreign investncnt allows for in roduction of new tcchnologies, increased capital to the
host country, and possible in rastructure overhauls); see also lVin Vin or Land Grab?,
Supra note 17, at 3 (outlining the benefits that foreign investment can have on a
cotUl)'s dcvelopnent).
38. See Win-11in or Land Grab supra note 17, at 3 (discussing contract fanning,
out-grower schemes, and joint ventures as alternatives to land purchase); see also
Hallan, supra note 6, at 34 (explaining that the rcccnt u end in agriculture is asset
acquisition, while general trends in foreign direct investment ("FDI") lean towards
m1ore flexible contractual agreements).
39. See Montnayor, supra note 24, at 99 (indicating that a joint venture where the
domestic partner acts as the contracting party on the land agreement allows the
partnership to bcncfit t omn domestic treatncnt); see also Paulo Sergio Franco & Schcila
Santos, Sending the Wrong Message: Land Rights: Nae Legislation for Forei n Land
Ownership in Brazil, KROLL TENDENCLS (Dec. 2010), http://www.krolltcndencias.com/
site/browse-archivcs/gcncral-interest-and-tirends/208-sending-the-wirong-cssage.html
(articulating how the Brazilian Attorney General suggestcd foreign companies forin a
partnership with domestic partners to avoid restrictions that are placed on non-
Brazilian entities).
40. See Montmcnayor, supra note 24, at 99 (discussing the potcntial benefits and
drawbacks of entering into ajoint venture in international agriculture).
41. See id. at 100 (describing the process whereby a foreign cntit) partners with
hundreds or thousands of small-scale farmers who then setvc as contract growers).
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retain a legal interest in the land.42 Leasing, purchasing, and
contract growing, while not the exclusive means of agreement,
are the primary modes through which individuals and
corporations structure land deals.
B. InternationalActors
Experts find it difficult to accurately analyze both the
statistics and actors involved in large rural land deals due to a
widespread lack of transparency. 4 3 Much of the recent publicity
involving overseas land deals stem from the entrance of
sovereign wealth funds and state actors into the international
rural land market. 44 In 2008, a spike in food prices caused some
of the top food-exporting countries to impose bans on food
exports to prevent domestic price increases and public unrest at
home.45 In effectuating the bans, these countries made it harder
for food-importing nations to get the food and supplies they
needed. 46 Following this market turbulence, many food-
importing countries decided to alter their food security policies
42. See id. (discussing investors' abilities to use contract growers to avoid the labor
costs that arise from employer-employee relationships and collective bargaining
agreements). But see Knaup & von Mittelstacdt, supra note 5 (asserting that contract
farming does not provide the same "conuol, ownership, high returns and, mlost of all,
securitv' that comes with titled ownership).
43. See DANIEL & MITTAI, .supra note 11, at 17 (noting that large land deals
involving foreign investors "often lack transparency"); see also Knaup & von
Mittelstaedt, spra note 5 (discussing the dilficulty experts face in assessing the amount
of land involved. when, "even [a] United Nations organization [] has to resort to Citing
newspaper reports").
44. See LOR(NZO COIUL-, E AL., FOOD & A(,Ric. ORG.. LAND GRAB OR
DFAI OPMENT OPPORTUNITY>: AGRICULTURAL INVESTMENT AN) INTERNATIONAL LAND
DEALS IN AERICA 33-34 (2009) (describing the increase in media reports regarding
international land deals and the various combinations of state and private financing
that facilitate the deals); see also De SchuttCr, supra note 5, at 516 (positing that most
government investnment occurs through a sovereign wealth fund or public enterprise).
45. See Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 2 (highlighting that at leas twenty-ive
countries imposed bans or restrictions on exporting food crops in 2008); see also Wvia-
Win or Land GrabP, supra note 17. at 2 (discussing recent global high food prices and
the implementation of export controls).
46. See Kugelman, supra note 2, at 2 (articulating the tenuous relationship of food-
exporting and food-importing nations in timies of scarcity).
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so that they would be less affected by market disturbances in the
future 47
As an alternative to relying on the world food market, some
countries have made it a matter of policy to acquire large tracts
of land overseas-these lands are then developed, farmed, and
the crops are shipped back to the home countr.4 Producing
crops in this manner permits a country to avoid the immediate
problems associated with market shortages and price volatility.4 -
As a further incentive to acquiring these farmlands, countries
that invest in land are not only getting crops, but are also
securing valuable land and water resources.50 Acquisition of
these resources is important in view of a growing concern
among countries with rapidly depleting freshwater supplies that
these resources will soon be scarce in their own countries. 1
Countries are thus looking overseas to acquire water and soil
resources, in addition to farmland, as a guard against future
shortages. 52
47. See id. at 2-3 (citing the food crisis-along with i roding topsoil, lack of water,
spreading urbanization, and crop diseases-as the motivation behind countries' desires
to acquire land overseas for agriculture); Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 2
(articulating the 2008 food crisis as the most visible reason for countries' increased
interest in land acquisition).
48. See Kugehnan, supra note 2, at 2-3 (describing ettorts to bypass the world food
market); see also klexei Barrionuevo, Chin a's Farmirg Pursuits Wake Brazil Uneasy, N.
TIMES, May 27, 2011, at Al (elaborating on China's strategy to larm land overseas and
ship crops back home in order to decrease reliance on crops firom the United States
and other countries).
49. See Kugelnan, supra note 2, at 2-3 (discussing countries' tendencies to invest
in land overseas to avoid the "high costs, supply shortages, and general volatility
plaguing global food imports"); see also DANILL & MITIAL, supra note 11, at 2 (citing
food security at home as the primar) reason countries are looking to acquire foireign
lands fo~r food production).
50. See Buying Farmlard Abroad: Outsourcirg' Third 14 ave, ECONOMIST, May 23,
2009, at 61 [hereinafter Outsourcing's Third Wave] (explaining how acquiring land
means acquiring the right to withdraw any water tied to it); see also Sadeque, supra note
31 (identifying that acquiring land often means acquiring water rights, whereby the
International Institute tor Sustainable Developments has described the recent surge in
sovereign land acquisition as a "water grab").
51. See De Schutter, supra note 5, at 516 (discussing how farmland and fresh water
may soon become scarce commodities); see, e.g., Sadeque, supra note 31 (observing that
the water beneath the Arab countries is "depleting rapidly," with Saudi Arabia's water
resources expected to dry up in the next fifty years).
52. See De Schutter. supra note 5, at 516; see also Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at
1-2 (examining the new outlook that agricultural land purchases are no longer solely
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International land deals have begun to garner greater
global attention as a result of the large amount of land involved
in some of the agreements.53 One of the most publicized deals
was a lease proposed by the Daewoo Logistics Corporation in
2008. 54  Backed by the South Korean government, the
corporation proposed a lease of 1.3 million hectares of farmland
in Madagascar--nearly half of all arable land in the country-
for US$6 billion. 5However, public outcry over the scope of the
lease resulted in a political coup, and the deal never went
through.56
Despite the fanfare surrounding large government
acquisitions, the majority of investment still comes from the
private sector. 5Since 2008, there has been a spate of large land
acquisitions by investment funds, mainly involving land in
about food, but are instead about securing land and water themselves to ensure future
access to food production facilities); Otsourcing's Third Wave, supra note 50
(articulating a desire to secure water resources as the "hidden impulse" behind many
cotuntries renewed desires for land).
53. See, e.g., Spieldoch & Murphy, supra note 4, at 42 (discussing a plan by the Gulf
Cooperation Council, a trading bloc of six Persian Gull states, to outsource food
production to Sudan and Pakistan as well as to countries in Southeast Asia, Africa,
Eastern Europe, and I afin America); see also Neil MacFarquhar, Aficean Frimers
Displaced as Investors !Wove In, N. TIMFS, L)ec. 22, 2010, at Al; L)ANIFI & MITTAL, supra
note 11, at 3 (analyzing large purchases of farmland by the United Arab Emirates.
which imports eighty-five percent of its lood). But cf Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 3
(outlining Saudi Arabia's establishment of the "King Abdullah initiative for Saudi
agricultural investment abroad,"a program aimed at providing credit to Saudi investors
who invest in agriculture abroad).
54. GORGEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 13-14 (describing the )aewoo Logistic
Corporation as a private vehicle acting in concert with the South Korean government
to substantially increase the country's access to overseas rural land holdings); see also
DANIEL & MITTAL, supra note 11, at 3 (highlighting the L)aewoo I ogisic proposal in
Madagascar as an extreme example of South Korea's strategy to acquire farmland
abroad in order to stabilize lood production and prices at home).
55. See DANIEL & MITTAL, supra note 11, at 3, 13 (discussing the )aewoo Logistics
proposal and noting that the corporation hoped to grow half of South Korea's corn on
the land and thus reduce the country's dependence on corn, as South Korea is the
world's Lhird-largest corn importer); Kugchnan, supra note 2, at I (citing the proposal
by Daewoo Logistics as one of the "largest and most notorious [land] deals").
56. See L)ANILL & MITTAL, supra note 11, at 3, 13 (examining the national outrage
over the government's decision to lease over a million hectares to a foreign
corporation); Kugelman, supra note 2, at 1 (remarking on the eventual collapse of the
deal).
57. See Win-Win or Land Grab2 , supa note 17, at 1 (finding that investment is
primarily in the private sector); Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 3.
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Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. 5 Investment funds are
the most significant actors in agricultural land acquisition, but
interest is increasing among smaller and more conservative
investors as well. 5 - The lack of transparency in many of these
deals, however, often makes it difficult to discern true private
investors from those with a private front supported by
government fundsO
Increased interest from both private and public investors in
overseas agricultural acquisitions has raised concerns over a lack
of international standards for land investment and the potential
for abuse, prompting the international community to propose
some guidelines.61 At a meeting in July 2009, the Group of Eight
("G8") agreed to create a "best practices" proposal to govern
foreign land transactions.62 The World Bank and the United
58. See, eg, DANILL & MITTAL, supra note 11, at 4 (reporting that BlackRock, a
New York-based investment management company, had established a two hundred
million dollar agricultural fund, thirty million dollars of which will go directly to buying
farmland, and lurther that US investor Philippe Heilberg leased 4,000 square
kilometers in Southcrn Sudan). But e'. Alan Katz & Peter Robison, Aorgan Stanley Bet
the Farm in L raine Before Taxpayers Bailout, BLOOMBERG MKTS. MAG. (Oct. 4, 2011),
http:/iwwv.bloomberg.cominevs/201 1-10-04/morgan-stanileybet-the-farm-in-ukraine-
betore-fc d-bailout-by-u-s-taxpayer.html (discussing Morgan Stanley's failed agricultural
project in the Ukraine).
59. See Knaup & von Mittelstaedt, sopra note 5 (describing the Global Aginvesting
C ontcrcnce 2009 as, "the first investors' conterence on the emerging worldwide market
in farinland," and noting the presence of divcrse invcstors-fiorn hedge fund
managers to representatives of large pension lunds to the CFO ol Harvard).
60. See Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 3 (stating that the private sector is the
main actor in foreign land acquisitions, taking the torm of agribusinesscs, invcstment
banks, hedge finds, and commodity traders). But .see Win-Wiv or Lan d Grab?. supra note
17, at 1 (discussing how although investment primarily comes from the private sector,
governments are often involved in provriding finance and support in a direct or indirect
manner); (J. Hallam, s~ua note 6, at 30 (noting that the private sector is often funded
by government or sovereign wealth funds, making it difficult to separlate public from
private sector involvement).
61. See Kugelman, supra note 2, at 9 (recognizing that various international
organizations are drafting such codes); see also Win-Win or Land Grab?. sp a note 17, at
1 (documenting how the increase in invcstment has causCd "substantial international
concern").
62. See Silvia Aloisi, G8 Baeks l armland Code of Conduct, Details Sketch, RLUTLRS,
July 9, 2009. available at htLp:/'/ ,w.reuters.co/article/2009/07/09/us-g8-sunmit-
agric ulture-landgrabs-sb-idUSTRE5683(C420090709 (reporting G8's commitment to
formulatc a joint proposal on best practices for intcrnational land investments):
Kugchnan, supra note 2, at 9 (describing the creation of the G8 proposal).
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Nations ("UN") are currently also drafting codes of conduct.
These codes focus largely on securing the host country's
national food supply and protecting local livelihoods in the face
of large foreign investment.64 Factors under consideration in
developing these codes include current land use, land tenure
arrangements, proposed land use and livelihoods, food security,
ecological conditions, transparency, terms of agreement, and
enforceability.6
C. Investment Climate in Brazil
The combination of natural resources and political and
economic stability makes Brazil one of the most promising
countries for agricultural development and investment.6 Brazil
has large tracts of arable land suitable for farming, as well as a
bounty of the natural resources necessary to grow crops: fresh
water, varied soil types, and a temperate climate that permits two
63. See Kugelnan, supra note 2, at 9 (discussing the various international
organizations that are drafting codes of conduct and best practices documents
regarding toreign land transactions); United Nations Conference on Tradc and
Development, Geneva, Switz., Apr. 26-30, 2010, Principes for Responsible Agricutural
Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources. U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.Ii/CRP.3
(Apr. 16, 2010) [hereinafter Principlesfor Responsible Agricultural Investme-] (outlining
fundamental principles such as environmental and social sustainability, local
participation, food security, and transparency, as important considerations in
international land investnent); see also Javier Bias, (N Set to Regulate 'armland Grabs,'
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 18, 2009, at 4 (reporting that these guidelines are
voluntar).
64. See De Schutter, supra note 5, at 505 (discussing the World Bank's
development of the Principles on Responsible Agricultural Investinert). But (f 17in-117r or
Land GrabP, supra note 17, at 4 (examining the need for an international code of
conduct tor countries without legal and procedural vehicles substantial enough to
protect the rights of owners or sellers).
65. See Meinzen-Dick & Markelova, supra note 28, at 79 (outlining the elements
that should be included in an international code of conduct tor international
acquisitions of agricultural land); Princ?pes sbr Responsible Agbic1,!i- 'Investment, sopra
note 63, at 5 (articulating the importance of assuring food security and Uansparency as
fundamental principles in land agreements).
66. See Reese Ewing, Brazil Ups St(kes fir Foreign Investors in Farmland, REUTERS,
Aug. 24, 2010. ht):'//i,.reuters.com/artice/2010/08/24/idUSN24252886
(declaring that "there are simply no large-scale altcrinativcs to Brazil's unique
agricultural potential"); Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 64-65 (rcproducing data that
shows Brazil is rated as the second best opportunity for capital apprctiation in real
estate and first among emerging counhics for real cstate acquisitions).
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or more harvests a year.67 It is the fourth-largest food exporter in
the world, and the leading supplier of sugar, coffee, orange
juice, ethanol, tobacco, and chicken.b8 In addition to its natural
bounty, Brazil has a stable democracy and has taken great strides
to improve its socioeconomic situation, placing it ahead of other
developing nations with comparable, or lesser, land prices. 9 As
of 2008, 572 million hectares of rural land were officially
registered to foreign owners. 711
In the last decade, Brazil has opened its industries to both
domestic and international private capital. 7' In 1993, the
67. See KIERAN (ARTIAN, ECONOMIST INTEL I IGENCE UNIT, THE (LOBAI IkOWFR OF
BRAZILIAN AGRIBUISNESS 4 (K-atherine Dorr Abreu ed.. 2010) (discussing Brazil's large
tracts of cheap, arable land, and fresh water supply, which is almost three times that of
the United States); see alsoJulia E. Sweig, A New Global Player: Brazil's Far-Flag Agenda,
FORLIGN An'., Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 173, 179 (noting that Brazil possesses eighteen
percent of the world's available freshwater resources and nearly a quarter of the land is
suitable for grazing); GORGEN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (listing Brazil as one of the
seven countries that comprise fifty percent of the total available arable land
worldwide).
68. See G(ARTLAN, supra note 67, at 2 (discussing Brazil's natural resources, its
already abundant tood production, and the countr)'s potential to be "the largest
agribusiness superpower"); see also Sweig, supra note 67, at 179 (citing Brazil as the
fourth-largest food exporter, with agricultural Giross Domestic Product growth between
2000 and 2007 surpassing China, India, and the global average).
69. See Sweig, supra note 67, at 175 (laying out how in the past two decades,
"[w]ith neither blood spilled nor territory annexed, Brazil consolidated a Inultiethnic
and multiracial democracy, stabilized a strong market economy, and lifted millions into
a growing middle class," while expanding its international presence); Spieldoch &
Murphy, supra note 4, at 44 (linding that most other countries with comparable
agricultural opportunitics to Brazil are much less stable-whether they are politically
volatile like Madagascar, Pakistan, and Zimbabwe, or involved in wars like Ethiopia and
the Sudan); see also Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 63 (discussing how countries with
stable legal structures provide investors with more certainty, but countries with less
stability have the potential for a larger payoif).
70. See Franco & Santos, s'upa note 39 (analyzing the amount of land officially
registered to foreigners, while noting that the number could be inaccurate due to
reporting ineificiencies).
71. See, e.g., Steven P. Otillar et al.. Recent Deveioments in Braz Oil & Gas
lndusty Brazil Appears to Be Stemmin g the Tide of Resorce Nationalis, 30 HOUS. J. INTL
L. 259, 262 (2008) (obselving that in 1995, the Brazilian Congress passed a
constitutional amendment to allow private entitics to invest in the oil and gas sector);
Juliette Kerr. Brazilian President Signis Law LiftingRestrictions on Foreig Ownership of Cable
Companie, GLOBAL INSIGHT, Sept. 15, 2011 (reporting thre passage of a law removing
restrictions on foreign ownership of cable companies); Brazil to Boost Foreign Oweship
in Airlines Through Decree, AE BR.LIL NLWSWIRE, Apr. 20, 2011 (reporting the issuance
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Brazilian government revised its constitution to eliminate any
distinction between domestic and foreign capital, putting
foreign investors on more even footing with their Brazilian
counterparts. 72  Subsequently, there was a corresponding
increase in the amount of FDI channeled into Brazil.73 In 2010,
the Brazilian agricultural industry received US$26 million in
FDI-a 225% increase from 2009.7 4Additionally, non-Brazilian
companies have become large, important players in the
country's economy.75 In 2000, sales by companies where the
majority of capital was owned by foreign investors accounted for
19.7% of Brazil's total output, while those companies were
responsible for 41.3% of exports and 49.3% of imports. 76
Additionally, high domestic interest rates prevent any
serious competition to foreign investors from domestic capital.77
Brazil's base domestic interest rate is currently 10.7%, making it
difficult for any business considered "high risk" to attract
domestic capital.7S Agriculture is perceived to be a high-risk
of a provisional decree permitting foreign investors to increase their ownership stakes
in local airlines).
72. See CLLIO HIATUI . FORLI(,N DIRLCT INVESTMENT AND TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL: RECENT TRENDS AND IMPACTS ON ECONOMIC DFAIVOPMENT
14 (2008) (analyzing how the elimination of the capital distinction was part of the
Brazilian government's policy to "create a "freer" environment" for transnational
corporations and foreign investment); see also U.S. COMMERCIAL SERV., DOING BUSINESS
IN BRX ZIL: 2011 COUNTRY COMMERAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES 58 (2011), available
at http:iiexport.govibrazilistatic,(- BR CCG FullDocument ILatest eg br
034878.pdf (documenting how Brazil does not currendy distinguish between foreign
and domestic capital).
73. See HIR ATUKA, supra note 72, at 1 (describing the surge in FD entering Brazil
in the 1990's); see also U.S. COMMERCIAL SERV., sutpra note 72, at 58 (pointing out that
Brazil is the largest recipient of FDI1 in South and Central America, with a predicted
intake of US$33 billion in FI)I in 2010).
74. See Ewing, supra note 66 at 5 (presenting the increased interest from foreign
investors in Brazilian agriculture); see also U.S. COMMERCIAL SLR\V., supra note 72 (Citing
FI)I in Brazil at $US33 million in 2010 and $US25.9 million in 2009).
75. See HIPATUKA, supra note 72, at 5-6 (showing that in 2003, 51.7% of the 500
largest private Brazilian companics were under foreign control).
76. Id. (outlining the increasingly important role that ioreign companies play in
the Brazilian economy).
77. See GARTLAN, supa note 67, at 8 (discussing how Brazil's high domestic
interest rate leaves little incentive for investors to put their money elsewhere).
78. See id. (analyzing how Brazil's 10.7% domestic interest rate makes obtaining
capital fo-om domestic investors difficult for high risk sectors since significant, safL
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sector, giving domestic investors little incentive to bet their
capital in agriculture, and creating more opportunity for foreign
capital.79
D. Investor Risk in Brazil
Investment in Brazilian agricultural land presents many
opportunities; however, there are also certain geopolitical risks
associated with these cross-border land transactions.8 11 The risks
can be envisioned in terms of two competing "land deal"
narratives.8' The first narrative casts the land deal as a
"beneficial investment," where outsiders view the transaction as
a helpful injection of capital that brings new technology to
undeveloped areas, contributes funds to infrastructure projects,
and provides an influx of capital and tax revenue to the host
count-.82 Conversely, a parallel narrative portrays the land sale
as a "neo-colonial land grab"-an usurpation of the traditional
small farmer and a dangerous precedent for the future of land
sustainability.*S: Public perception of a land deal can impact the
way the deal is structured, as well as the long-term viability of the
investment.84
returns can be made elsewhere); see geralerly Alex Segura-Ubiergo, The Puzzle oJ'Brazil's
High Interest Rates, (Int'l Monetar) Fund, Working Paper No. 12/62, 2012).
79. See id. (noting that Brazilian banks classify agriculture as a "high risk sector"
and that as a result, many Brazilian corporate farms have sought backing fi-on foreign
investors).
80. See, e.g, Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 63 (articulating that countries with a
poorly developed rule of law have increased invesUncnt risks but also the opportunit)
for the highest long-tern earnings).
81. See Atkin, supra note 18, at 110 (examining the cnotional ties people often
have to land issues); see also Mcinzen-Dick & Markelova, supra note 28, at 75 (describing
the "two iLajojt competing narraives" that define foreign land acquisition); WVin-ui or
Lard Grab, supa note 17, at 3 (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of international
invesUncnt in agriculture).
82. See Meinzen-Dick & Markelova, supra note 28, at 75 (delineating the elements
considered in various public perceptions of large, rural land deals); see also )e
SchuttCr, supra note 5, at 520 (outlining potential benefits host countries receive fi o1
an influx of foreign capital).
83. See Meinzen-Dick & Markelova, supra note 28, at 75 (denoting how local
populations iay view large land deals as a corporate usurpation of a traditional way of
lif ).
84. See Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 67 (explaining that public perception can
play a large role in a host country's reception of foreign investors, and that foreign land
purchases can be politicalh unstable for the host governmnent).
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A primary concern for investors in this situation is the risk
of a regulatory taking. Blatantly political takings, such as the
large-scale nationalizations that Venezuelan President Hugo
Chavez oversaw in his country, are unlikely to occur in Brazil.85
Brazilian law is rigorous in its protection of real property
ownership, and the government has no recent history of
expropriation actions against foreign companies. sb Further,
nationalization does not align with the trend of privatization
embraced by the Brazilian government since the 1990s. "
Another possibility is that a regulatory taking could
manifest as an agrarian land reform project, acting to
redistribute land and expropriate large farms.88 Land ownership
in Brazil is highly concentrated-a small and wealthy social elite
controls large areas, while many others are left landless.8 9 The
85. See Nathan Crooks & Corina Rodriguez Polls, Chavez Orders Gold Repatriation,
Will Nationalize Industry, BLOOMBERG BUSINLSSWEEK (Aug. 17. 2011),
http:/iwwv.businessweek.cominewVs/2011-08-17ichavez-orders-gold-repatriation-will-
nationalize-industry.hunl (discussing how Hugo Chavez's decision to nationalize many
of the country's primary industries has established Venezuela as a "brutal place to do
business" tor toreign investors); see also Venezuelas ationaliations Under Chavez,
REUTERS (Dec. 2011), available at htLp:// ,.reuters.co /article/2011/12/O1/
venezuiiela-nationalizations-idUSN 1 E79IOZ520 111201 (detailing the Various
nationalizations Chavez enacted across Venezuela).
86. See Lei No. 10406 of Jan 10, 2002. No. 10406. Book 11. tit. I, chs.II & I1,
CODIGO CiVIL [C.C. ] [Civil C odc] (Braz.) (providing an expansive definition of private
property); U.S. COMMERCIAL SERV., supra note 72, at 62 (noting no recent
expropriations against foreign entities); see also Scan Gear), ls itFinaly Time to Buy Vale,
EMERGING MONEY (May 2012), http:/ /ccrgingmoney.com stocks finally-time-buy-
vale-pbr (indicating that the current Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseif, recognizes
the harm that nationalization will have on foreign dirct investment and that she has
no intention of embarking on that path).
87. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (outlining Brazil's increasing
acceptance of private domestic and foreign capital in key industries).
88. See Kristen Mitchell, Warket-4ssisted Land Reorm in Brazil A ,w Approach to
Address an Old Problem, 22 N.Y.I. SCH. j. INTI & COMP. . 557, 564-68 (2003)
(identifying the Estatuto da Terra (Land Statute) as the primary vehicle for
expropriative land reform and discussing how land relorm played a large role in
Brazil's transition democracy); see also Agrarian Reforot in Brazil FOo) FIRST INFO. &
ACTION NETWORK ("FIAN") (May 2000), available at http:,'// w.fao.org/righttofOod/
KUidownloadsivlidocs/AH264.pdf (outlining the way in which expropriation can be
implicated in Brazilian agrarian reform initiatives).
89. See Mitchell, supra notC 88, at 563-66 (reporting that the largest rwo percent of
Brazil's landholdings occupy fifty-seven percent of all agricultural land, while 4.8
million Brazilian families own no land); see also Assentamento Manocl Nero, This Land
is Anti-Capitalist Land. ECONOMIST (Apr. 2007), http://www onomist.com/ nodc/
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inequitable distribution of land has caused periods of popular
unrest and made land reform a hot-button political issue. °
Despite this on-going struggle, reform measures that consider
expropriation or significant infringement on existing owners'
property rights are likely to be met with substantial economic
opposition and constitutional challenges. 91
The Brazilian Civil Code is highly protective of private
property rights and treats most infringements as a compensable
taking of property.92 Further, Brazilian courts have interpreted
the constitutional "fair compensation" provision as requiring
the government to pay market value for property.93 Providing
full compensation for land is extremely expensive, making mass
expropriation an unlikely vehicle for land reform.9 4 Moreover,
9079861 (providing a brief history of Brazil's inequitable land distribution and noting
that the last Brazilian census indicated one percent of owners controlled forty-five
percent of the farmland).
90. See Spieldoch & Murphy, supa  note 4, at 45 (examining how disputes over
landownership "have a long and violent histor) in much of thre developing world,
where the legacy of land dispossession carries a poweriul political charge relating to
national identity, reconciliation, 'justice, and the legitimacy of the state"); see also
Mitchell, supra note 88, at 557, 564-71 (summnarizing the recent histol) behind Brazil's
inequitable land ownership and the physical and political conflicts that have resulted).
91. See Mitchell, supra note 88, at 568, 580) (assessing the extensive constitutional
protections extended to propery rights, and how the practice of Brazilian courts to
award full market value to expropriated lands makes land relorm via expropriation
iniasible); see also Angeline Thomas, Killing Two Birds with One Stone: Implementing Land
Reform and Combating Climate Change in Brazil's Amazon Under Law 11. 952.09, 9 SLATTLL
J. FOR SOC. JLST. 1107, 1113-14 (2011) (explaining how the constitutional requirement
that the government provide fair market value for land made land reform via
expropriation a practical impossibility).
92. See Iei No. 10406 of Jan 10, 2002, No. 10406, Book 1I, tit. I, chs.II & I1,
CODIGO CIn [C.C.] [Civil Code] (Braz.) (delining private property and creating a
default whereby ever)thing that is not specificall designated as public property is
private property); see also Mitchell, sppra note 88, at 568 (discussing the Brazilian Civil
Codcs staunch protections for property owners and how an infringement will likely be
considered a compensable taking).
93. See CONSTITUIAo FLDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 5(24) (Braz.)
(requiring fair compensation for any expropriation); Mitchell, sup a note 88, at 569
(noting that the Brazilian Constitution requires the government pay "fair
compensation" for expropriated properties).
94. Mitchell, supa note 88, at 580 (explaining that land reforim based on large-
scale expropriation would be a "tough sell" because it would require a change in the
legal structure that provides fhll, costly compensation for expropriated land); see also
Thomas, supa note 91, at 1113-14 (outlining the ctononic inipossibilities of paying
fair market value for land in an agrarian reform initiative).
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Article 185 of the constitution specifically prohibits
expropriating private lands for agrarian reform, declaring that
"expropriation of the following for agrarian reform purposes is
not permitted: (i) small and medium-size rural property, as
determined by law, provided its owners do not own other
property; (ii) productive property."95 "Productive property" has
traditionally been interpreted broadly, giving this article the
effect of substantially narrowing the avenues for expropriation.9-
A final risk associated with regulatory taking stems from a
possible change in the law itself, which is the type of risk that
investors faced after the AGU's 2010 opinion limiting land
ownership by foreign-controlled entities.- 7  The Brazilian
government has maintained that the new interpretation does
not apply retroactively to existing land deals. 98 However, any
deals that were in the process of being drafted but were not
finalized before the 2010 opinion must now take the restrictions
into account.9
Although investors seeking remedies can rely on
international law as a default set of best practices, addressing
issues as they arise in individual contracts can provide a more
secure investment plafform. 100 Contract provisions can address
95. See CONSTITLIICAO FEDELRAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 185 (Braz.).
96. See Mitchell, sapra note 88, at 568-69 (specifying that the "productive use"
requirement is easily met and generally does not provide grounds for expropriation).
97. See.Jose Paulo Bueno et al., New Rules-Restrictions on the Acquisition of Rural
Real Prperties by Foreigners in Brazil, Al' INT'L NLWSLLTTER (Arafujo c Policastro
Advogados, Sao Paulo, Brazil) (Sept. 2010), http://wwv.araujopolicastro.con.br/
boletimacp/News_carlN6_Scp20Ih0.hml (explaining that prior to the AGU's 2010
opinion, Brazilian corporations were entitled to own rural land, regardless of
shareholder composition, but now majority toreign-owned corporations are subject to
severe restrictions); see also B g Crackdown on Foreig77 Firos'Land Ownership, supra note 9
(reporting that foreign and Brazilian subsidiaries of foreign companies are subject to
the restrictions outlined in Brazilian Law 5.709, as discussed in Part II).
98. See Stuber & Stuber, supra note 9 at N132 (clarifying that the AGU opinion
does not aflect transactions closed before its publication); .see also Ewing, sopra note 66
(reporting that the Brazilian government (lid not mention the possibility of a
retroactive application of the law or annulling any previous purchases).
99. See Protectionism in Brazil A ef-Wade Siege, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24. 2011. at 48
(reporting that as a result of the change in the law. some sellers now have deals that are
"as good as garbage"); see also Franco & Santos, supra note 39 (discussing the possibility
that land purchases may be annulled if they conflict wvith the new legal limits).
100. See G(ORGEN EL AL., supra note 6, at 16-17 (enumerating various torms of
international law that can apply to international land deals, and suggesting that
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various issues critical to international land investment, from
choice of law questions to detailing the right to export. 10 1 While
an investor is usually assumed to possess the right to export the
crops produced on her land, provisions can be included to
expand or curtail this right.10 2 Further, contracts can specifically
outline the steps each party can take in the case of a food
shortage in the host country, ensuring protection of the
fundamental human right to food while also safeguarding the
investment. 10 ", Finally, risks generally associated with agricultural
investments-including the volatility of commodities prices and
the risk of depreciation of land values-can also be addressed
through contracts. 104
These investor precautions are important to structuring
smart and sustainable international land deals. An increasing
global population and the limited amount of land available to
feed it has created a market that will not diminish but only
grow. 0 5 Brazil's relative political stability and sound rule of law,
combined with the country's bountiful natural resources, render
it an attractive target for this type of investment, and make the
specilying particular requirements in the contract is the best way to "set[] legal
standards"); see also Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 4, Box 2 (outlining three sources
of law that govern foreign investments in agricultural land: domestic law, international
investment contracts, and international investment agreements).
101. See Timothy Hansen, The Lega Lffect Given Stabilization Clauses in Economic
Development Agreemnts, 28 VA. J. INTL L. 1015. 1016 (1988) (describing how foireign
investors traditionally seek stabilization clauses to prevent the host lfom altering or
terminating the agreement with new legislation).
102. See G(ORGLN ET AL., swpra note 6, at 16 (outlining an investor's "right to
export," but indicating that the right can potentially be limited by multilateral
agreements in instances of food shortages); see also Mann & Smaller, supra note 4, at 4
(commenting that the right to export all or almost all production is a delault provision
in most agricultural land contracts, but that it is possible to contract around this
assumption).
103. See Meinzen-)ick & Markelova, supra note 28, at 77 (identifing potential
risks-including local unrest-investors lace if they continue to export crops during a
host countr) food shortage); see also Mann & Smallcr, supra note 4, at 2 (pointing out
that at least twenty five countries imposed export bans or restrictions in 2008).
104. See Blumenthal, supra note 15, at 67-68 (analyzing the historical volatility of
commodities prices and the risks associated with deprcciation in land value).
105. See I)ANIEL & MITTAL,supra note 11, at 2 (explaining how the increasing
scarcity of land and water resources. combined with a growing population, has led
many countries to search out overseas land); see also GORGEN ET AL.,.spra note 6, at 6
(evaluating the growing competition for agricultural land as a result of the growth in
demand fir food and deterioration of ovcr-used land).
20121 RESTRICTIONS ON LAND A CQUISITION IN BRAZIL 1765
formation of a stable, transparent investment platform a high
priority.
II. LAW5. 709 AND RECENT CHANGES IN THE FRAMEWORK
GOVERLING FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF RURAL LANDS IN
BRAZIL
Market forces and an appealing venue tell only half the
story of rural land investment. This Part considers the other half
by reviewing applicable Brazilian legislation and the general
policies motivating changes in the law. Part II.A examines Law
5.709 and the restrictions it places on foreign acquisition of
rural lands in Brazil. Part II.B then analyzes the AGU's 2010 re-
interpretation of Law 5.709, the extension of its restrictions to
Brazilian businesses, and its impact on the foreign acquisition of
rural lands.
A. Law 5.709
In 1971, the Brazilian military government passed Law
5.709 amidst a larger protectionist policy.""t Law 5.709 currently
governs rural property acquisition by non-citizens.)17 The law
pertains to land acquisitions by both non-Brazilian individuals
who have residency in Brazil and foreign legal entities
authorized to operate in Brazil. °8 It limits these individuals and
legal entities in a varietv of ways.10  One of these limitations is an
area restriction that caps foreign acquisition of rural property at
106. See Franco & Santos, supr(t note 39 (explaining how Law 5.709 was passed by a
military government concerned with national security); see also David Roberto R. Soares
da Silva, Foreig'n Ownershp oJ'Brair Rrd Lands: Rues, Restrictions and Opporities
(Sept. 2007), http:i/lexuniversal.com pt/articles/3366 (establishing historical context
for the passage of Law 5.709 in 1971, emphasizing that the Cold War was underway and
Brazil was under a military government that prioritized control over rural and border
lands as a mattCr of national defense).
107. See Let No. 5.709, art. 5(l), de 7 de Outubro de 1971, I)IARIO OFICiAL DA
UNLO [D.O.U.] de 7.10.1971, art. 1 (Braz.).
108. See id. art. I (outlining the scope of the law). But (f Stuber & Stuber, supra
note 9, at N131 (obsciving that foreign individuals who do not have permancnt
residence in Brazil cannot acquire rural land unless they inherit it).
109. See Let No. 5.709, art. 5(l), de 7 de Outubro de 1971, DIARiO OJlcAAL DA
UNLO [D.O.U.] de 7.10.1971, arts. 3-5, 7-10. 12 (outlining restrictions on the size.
use, and manner in which foreigners can acquire land).
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a maximum of fifty modules in any continuous or discontinuous
area.10 The Brazilian Institute for Agrarian Reform (Instituto
Nacional de Colonizagdo e Reforma Agrdria ("INCRA") is
responsible for determing the size of a land module, which can
vary from two to ten hectares depending on the nature and
composition of the region. I I The Brazilian president is the only
individual with the authority to increase the number of hectares,
and she can only do so after consulting with the National
Security Council. 1 2 Additionally, strict Brazilian nationality
provisions further constrain ownership, such that foreign
ownership of rural land in any given municipality cannot exceed
twenty-five percent of the total land area, and no single
nationality can own more than forty percent of the quarter
allowed. 1 '
The law also contains a usage requirement whereby a
foreign entity may only purchase rural properties for
implementation of agricultural, industrial, or colonial projects
that are linked to its corporate purposes.11 4 A regional land
agency and the national ministry of agriculture must approve
each proposed project.115 Further, all land sales must be
registered in state registries, and a real estate registration official
must send quarterly reports of lands acquired by foreigners to
110. See id. art. 3 (describing the parameters of land ownership permitted for
foreigners).
11. See Mitchell, supra note 88, at 564 (outlining the size of a land module); see
also Bueno et al., supra note 97, at 2 (indicating that Instituto Nacional de Colonizaa(o
e Retorina Agraria ("INCRA") determines the size of a module tor each municipality);
Mitchell, supra note 88, at 564 (explaining that the size of a "'module'" varies
depending on land productivity and regional use). But Uf Law 5.709, art. 3(1), de 7 de
Outubro de 1971, DI)RIO OIcLAL DAUNIAO [D.O.U.] de 7.10.1971 (Braz.) (speciing
that acquisition of property under three modules is not subject to regulation). Instituto
Nacional de Colonizaa(o e Reforina Agraria ("INCRA") is an organization established
in 1971 to iniplenent land reiorm. See Paolo Groppo, Agrarian Reform and Land
Settlemert Policy in Brazil:. Historical Backg ur d, FOOD & AGRC. ORG. OF THL UNITLD
NATIONS (June 1996) http:/iwww.lao.org/sdiLtdirectiLtanOO06.htm.
112. See Lei No. 5.709, art. 5(1), de 7 de Outubro de 1971, DiAttIO OncAL DA
UNLO [D.O.U.] de 7.10.1971, art. 3(3) (describing the process by which only the
President can allow a non-Brazilian entity to exceed the statutory limitations).
113. See id. art. 12 (1) (outlining nationality limitations).
114. See id. art. 5 (listing the approved uses for land).
115. See id. art. 5(1) (dcescribing the process by which corporations must get their
land purchases approved).
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the ministry of agriculture.i The registry entry must include
the identity of the purchaser and proof of residence or
authorization to purchase. 1  There is also a provision requiring
special government consent for areas that are considered a
national security concern."18 Any acquisition of property in
violation of the outlined restrictions is void, and both the notary
public who prepared the deed and the real estate registration
official who registered it can be held civilly and criminally
liable.11 9
B. The AGU's 2010 Legal Opinion
Article 1(1) of Law 5.709 defines the legal persons and
entities subject to the provisions of the law as "foreign persons
or entities that have most of their capital and residence or
headquarters abroad." 20 Until August 2010, Brazilian
authorities did not consider companies incorporated in Brazil to
constitute "foreign entities" for purposes of Law 5.709, even if
the companies were majority-owned by foreigners.1 21 Thus,
foreign companies based in Brazil and established under
Brazilian law were not subject to the restrictions outlined in Law
5.709 and could purchase rural land without restriction.' 22
116. See id. arts. 9-11 (outlining the registration requircncnts); see also Franco &
Santos, supra note 39, at 2 (describing the process foreign entities must go through to
acquire rural land).
117. See Law 5.709, arts. 9-10 (requiring corporations filing for registration to also
include documientation of the corporation's charter, a license to operate in Brazil, and
details about the identity of the shareholders).
118. See id. arts. 7, 11 (requiring that the General Secretary of the National
Security Council provide prior conscnt if the properly in question is located in an area
considered vital to national securit).
119. See id. art. 15; see also Stuber & Stuber, supra note 9, at 131 (illustrating the
legal ramifications should officials not comply with the new registration requirements
for toreign land acquisitions).
120. See Law 5.709, art. 1 (1).
121. See Bueno et al., supra note 97, at 1-2 (outlining the AGU's previous
decisions not to classil) Brazilian corporations with a majorit) toreign ownership as
"foreign entities" for the purposes of Law 5.709); see also Franco & Santos, supra note
39 (articulating how prior to the AGU's 2010 opinion, all companies based in Brazil
could buy land without consraint, regardless of the origin of their capital ownership).
122. See Franco & Santos, supra note 39 (discussing how all companies established
under Brazilian law could acquire land without restriction betore tihe 2010 AGU
opinion).
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Prior to August 2010, the AGU had consistently held that
Article 1 (1) of Law 5.709 did not encompass foreign-controlled
Brazilian businesses.1 23 In 1994, the AGU opined on the
constitutionality of applying Article 1 (1) to foreign-controlled
Brazilian businesses based on Article 171 of the 1988 Brazilian
Constitution, which distinguished between Brazilian companies
operating with national capital and those operating with foreign
capital. 124 In this unpublished opinion, the AGU determined
that the purpose behind the capital distinction in Article 171
was to confer benefits on businesses operating with national
capital, and not to place greater restrictions on those operating
without national capital. 25 The AGU opined that it was
unconstitutional to apply Article 1(1) to Brazilian companies
operating with foreign capital because harsher restrictions
would penalize the company for operating without national
capital. '26
The constitution was amended in 1995, and Article 171 was
revoked, eliminating the legal distinction between foreign and
123. See Parecer ((U/AGU No. LA-01/2008-RVJ, art. 2 26, de 3 Setcmbro de
2008, I)IARIO OFICIAL LA UNIAO [I) ).U.] de 23.08.2010 (Braz.) (outlining how the
AGU is responsible tor interpreting laws and constitutional provisions when legal
questions or controversies arise).
124. See CONSTITUICAO FFT)ERAI [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 171 (Braz.)
(repealed 1995) (creating a distinction between domcstic and toreign capital); see also
Parecer AGUJ No. 22/1994 (declining to extend the restrictions to Brazilian companies
that have a majority foreign ownership): Bueno et al., supra note 97 (analyzing the 1994
AGU opinion not to extend the limitations in Law 5.709 to Brazilian companies with a
majority foreign ownership).
125. See Parecer AGU No. 22/1994 (examining the policy reasons behind the
capital distinctions); see also Bueno et al., supra note 97 (discussing the factors behind
the changes in the new constitution with regard to Brazilian companies); HIRATIUI .
supra note 72. at 13-14 (discussing the implementation of toreign versus domestic
capital distinctions and the government's use of the difierentiation to limit toreign
involvement in certain sectors).
126. See Parecer AGU No. 22/1994 (declining to extend the restrictions, based on
constittional interpretation); see also Bueno ct al., supa noe 97 (finding the
reasoning behind the AGU's refusal to extend restrictions to Brazilian companies with
a majority toreign capital was based on poliw intcntions in the new Constitution);
Parecer CGU/AGU No. LA-01/2008-RVJ 1[ 34, de 3 Setembro de 2008. DiRIo OICIAL
DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 23.08.2010 (Braz.) (specifying that the AGU's decision not to
extend the rcstrictions outlined in Law 5.709 to Brazilian companies with a foreign
controlling interest).
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domestic capital.1 27  The amendments also changed the
definition of a Brazilian firm to encompass any company
established under Brazilian law, regardless of its source of
capital.' 2s In 1998 the Brazilian government requested a second
opinion from the AGU on the applicability of Article 1(1) to
Brazilian firms operating with a majority of foreign capital.129
The AGU reaffirmed the stance taken in the 1994 opinion. He
again opined that the restrictions in Law 5.709 should not apply
to Brazilian companies, even if a majority of the capital was held
by foreign legal entities because the company was a "Brazilian
firm," regardless of its source of capital.'30
Twelve years later, however, the AGU took a different
stance. On August 23, 2010 the General Counselor of the
Republic published legal opinion CGUiAGU 01/2008,
previously approved by the AGU and the president, which
extended the restrictions outlined in Law 5.709 to Brazilian
companies with majority foreign capital. 13' The legal opinion
established that any Brazilian company in which a majority of
127. See SERGIO SAMPAIO CONTREIRAS I)E AIMEDA, (;EO. WASH. U. INST. OF
BRAZILLAN BuS. & PUB. MGMT ISSUES, RECENT CHANGES IN THE BRAZILIAN
(ONSTITUTION: FROM R'FORM TO GROWTH 18, 29 (2000), http://wwW.gwu.edu/ibi/
miner-,aiSpring200 /Almeida.pdf (examining how the elimination of capital
distinctions was part of the Brazilian governmnclt's attempt to decrease intervention in
the economic sector); see also Bueno et al., supra note 97 (describing how the
revocation of Article 171 eliminated the definition of a Brazilian company that
separated it foin toreign companies).
128. See )E ALMLIDA, supra note 127, at 29, 32-34 (discussing the various changes
wrought by the 1995 amendments to the constitution); see also Bueno et al., sopra note
97 (outlining tlic elimination of the distinction between a Brazilian company and a
Brazilian company financed with national capital).
129. See Bueno ct al., supra note 97 (indicating that the Brazilian government
solicited the AGU again in 1995 to provide another opinion oin whether restrictions
should be applied to Brazilian companies that were maiority foreign owned).
130. See Parecer GQ No. 181/98, 1998. DIARIO ()FiCIAL IA UNIXO [L).O.U.] de
23.08.2010 (Braz.) (describing the character of a Brazilian firm); see also Bueno ct al.,
supra note 97 (noting the AGU's decision not to distinguish between Brazilian
companies of foreign capital and Brazilian companies of domestic capital). But (J.
Protectionism ip Brazil. A SelfMade Siege. supra note 99, at 3 (discussing how tlic 1971
land ownership law is "antique" and applying the restrictions selectively to businesses
run with foreign capital as "incompatible with the new democratic Constitution and
open econoInly").
131. See Parecer CGU/AG( U No. IA-0 /2008-R J, de 3 Setembro de 2008, DLRiO
Oiu JAL DA UNLAO [D.O.U.] de 23.08.2010 (Braz.) (interpreting Law 5.709 to apply to
Brazilian corporatiols with a majority foreign ownership).
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the corporate capital was held by a foreign individual or legal
entity was considered a foreign legal entity for purposes of
Article 1(1) of Law 5.709, and subject to the law's limitations.13 2
This interpretation subjected foreign corporate investors to all
of the limitations of Law 5.709 and severely limited the amount
of land they could purchase or lease. '33
The AGU's choice to extend the restrictions of Law 5.709 to
foreign-controlled Brazilian companies was a reversal from the
previous two opinions. 34 The Brazilian government cited a
range of reasons for the change in applicability, from an
increase in food prices to national security. 35 The AGU found
the authority to break from previous interpretations primarily in
Article 172 of the constitution, which stated that "the law shall
regulate, based on national interests, the foreign capital
investments, shall encourage reinvestments, and shall regulate
the remittance of profits. '' 36i Many commentators felt, however,
that the most pressing factor behind the change in opinion was
a concern over the increased presence of sovereign wealth funds
132. See id. (outlining the new interpretation of "foireign legal entity" to appi) to
Brazilian companies wvith a majority foreign ownership); see also Franco & Santos, ,supr
note 39 at 2 (discussing the extension of the law to foireign-controllcd Brazilian
companies).
133. See Ewing, supra note 66 (identifying how the 2010 legal opinion "closed a
loophole" that investors were using to acquire land as domestic companies); see also Lei
No. 8629, art. 23, de 25 de Fevereiro de 1993, LI)RIO OFICAL DA UNLO [D.O.U.] de
23.02.1993 (Braz.) (holding that ioreign leases of rural land are subject to the same
restrictions and conditions under Law 5.709 as foireign purchases); ALIENS, BRAZIL LAw
DIGLST: MARTrNDALE-HUBBLLL LAW DIGEST § 16.01 (2010) (discussing the new
limitations on land acquisition).
134. See Bueno CL al., supra note 97 (articulating how the A(GU's opinions on the
same subject in 1994 and 1998 were in direct contradiction to the 2010 opinion); see
also Rural Land in Brazil and the Foreigners, REAI ESTATE NEWSLETTER (Barbosa,
Mutssnich & Aragao, Advogados, Brazil), Aug. 2010, available at
http:/iwwv.bmalaw.coin.brinova internet/arquivos I mobilidrio Real%20Estate%
20Newsletteraugust_2010-special%20cdition.htLI (illustrating how the 2010 AGU
opinion effectively revoked the previous AGU opinions on Law 5.709).
135. See Stuber & Stuber, sopra note 9 (discussing how the most recent AGU
opinion was influenced by national sovereignty principles, as well as "the increase of
value of agricultural commodities. the world food crisis and biofuels developments").
136. CONSTITUIAo FLDERAL [CF.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 172 (Braz.); see also
Bueno et al., supra note 97 (examining the AGU's use of Article 172 and principles of
national sovereignty and independence as support fir the decision).
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in the land acquisition market.13 In particular, the Brazilian
government was concerned over China's increasing dominance
in global markets and wanted to limit that country's influence
on Brazilian soil.' 38 China was Brazil's largest source of
international investment and its largest export market for soy,
oil, and iron. 39 China was also a frontrunner in overseas
agricultural land acquisition.1 40 Combined, these factors left
Brazil anxious about allowing large amounts of domestic land to
fall under Chinese control.1 41
Though the AGU's opinion was not the legal equivalent of
an enacted law, it was binding on all federal government
agencies and had a direct effect on the amount of land
foreigners could acquire.1 42 Following the 2010 AGU opinion,
international investment in Brazilian agriculture dropped
137. See Joy Leahy, Brazil Plans Curbs on Farmland Speculation, FIN. TIMLS (U.K.),
Mar. 6, 2011, http:/iwwwi.t.con/intl/cms/siO(i333b494-4819-1 I eO-b323-
00144fcab49a.html (discussing Brazilian Agricultural Minister Wagner Rossi's desire to
sort speculators and sovereign funds from foreign investors "with good projects"); see
also Protectionism in Brazil: A Self Viade Siege. supra note 99 (suggesting that the AGU
opinion carne about because the Brazilian government was "spooked by tire idea of
foreign sovereign-wealth lunds and state-owned firms buying up vast tracts [of rural
land]").
138. See Sweig, supra note 67. at 175 (asserting that Brazil is currently very aware of
the potential threat posed by the combination of China's market power and recent
focus on stockpiling resources); see also A Young iVlariage on the Rocks. REUTERS (Feb.
2011), htLp:, ,iw.reuters.colm/article/2011/02/03/uk-brazil-china-idUIKLNE7120272
0110203 (discussing recent attempts to level out what Brazil sees as a power
imbalance).
139. See Sweig, supra note 67, at 175 (establishing China's position both as Brazil's
largest foreign investor and main export market); Barrionuevo, sopra note 48, at Al
(describing China as Brazil's largest trading partner).
140. See Leahy, supra note 137 (reporting that China. South Korea. and the Gulf
states have all started buying agricultural land in Africa to increase lood security). But
cf Ewing, supra note 66 (discussing Chinese companies' plans to invest in Brazilian
farmland).
141. See Leahy, spra note 137 (expressing an expert's opinion that when the
Brazilian government expresses wariness over the reach of sovereign funds,
"' [s] overcign funds' means the Chinese"); see also Ewing, supra note 66 (positing that
the Brazilian government is especially wary of allowing any companies affiliated with
China to make large land purchases).
142. See Franco & Santos, supra note 39 (describing thre legal eftct of the 2010
opinion); see also Bueno et al., sopra note 97, at 3 (discussing how the opinion binds the
fcderal administration, including the real estate registry, which is the only body capable
of issuing legal title to land in Brazil).
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substantially.143, In addition to a direct impact on land
transactions, the 2010 opinion's divergence from previous
government publications was also indicative of policy
inconsistencies on the part of the Brazilian government, which
caused uncertainty among investors. 144 The immediate and long-
term ramifications of a loss of foreign capital are difficult to fully
encapsulate, but will undoubtedly have negative effects on both
the value of rural property and the agricultural industry in
Brazil.1 45 The country will have a difficult, if not impossible, time
reaching its potential production capacity without foreign
capital. 146
I1. DRAFTI7NG NEWLEGISLATION A WORKABLE
FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND LVINES TOR
CONFIDENCE IN BRAZIL
The AGU's 2010 opinion changed the equation for many
investors who had previously been keen to invest funds in
Brazil's agricultural industry. Restrictive and cumbersome
limitations on rural land ownership made investment more
difficult, more expensive, and less attractive to new investors
143. See Alastair Stewart, Brazil's Congress andForeign Land Owe'hiC- PROGRESSIVE
FARaLR (Aug. 3, 2011. 11:03 AM), http://w.dtnprogrssivefameircom (enter "2011,
Brazil's Congress and Foreign ILand Ownership" into the search box) (reporting that
the 2010 AGU opinion caused the suspension of US $15 billion of investments in
agriculture); see also Bowden, supra note 8 (discussing how the new legal interpretation
could place up to thirty-five billion dollars in potential investnents at risk over the next
five years).
144. See Protectionism in Brazib A Set]Made Siege, supra note 99 (analyzing the 2010
opinion as an embrace of a protectionist mentality, in the face of an alhost-certain halt
in foreign investment); see also Stewart, sup a note 143 (implying that the recent
interpretation of the 1971 law resulted in an uncertainty that scares off investors").
145. See Ewing, supra note 66 (asserting that rural property prices will suffer if
foreign capital is unavailable): see also Protectionism in Brazil. A Self -Vade Siege, supra note
99 (discussing how land registries are categorically rejecting all foreign purchasers in
attempts to stave off liability). But c. Franco & Santos, sup a note 39 (discussing how
the AGU voiced confidence that investors would find a way to adapt to the new
regulations, possibly by partnering wvith Brazilian entities).
146. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text (outlining the difficulties
involved in obtaining domestic capital for agriculture in an economic environment
with high interest rates); see also GARTLAN, supra note 67, at 8 (examining how foreign
capital not only brings a cheaper inflow of capital but also important technology and
know-how to the industry, spurring greater developnent).
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who were vital to the growth of the Brazilian agricultural
industry. Further, the decision evoked long-term concerns about
the commitment of the Brazilian government to foreign
investment in the land sector.
This Part argues that Law 5.709 is antiquated, unclear, and
should be replaced with new legislation. Part IILA examines the
insufficient remedies proposed by the Brazilian government and
the international community. Part II.B then sets forth a
recommendation that Brazil fashion new legislation that forgoes
a blanket ban on large foreign acquisitions and instead focuses
on individual land agreements. Specifically, it highlights the
need for transparency and an accurate recording system so that
the Brazilian government can create a narrowly tailored solution
that distinguishes between sovereign purchasers and private
corporations while still allowing for needed international
investment.
A. International Proposals
After issuing the 2010 interpretation, the Brazilian
government suggested that in order to avoid the harsh
restrictions of the new interpretation, foreign companies should
work with Brazilian partners. 47 Forming a partnership with a
domestic entity would enable an investor to circumvent the
newly-applicable restrictions, since the deed or lease would be in
the local partner's name.1 48 The foreign investor, however,
would not have the same control or security over the asset as she
would if she were the contracting party-she would not have a
legal stake in the land and would have to share profits with the
local partner.149 In some instances, a partnership could be
beneficial; however, it is not the correct solution for every
147. See sup a note 39 (discussing the AGU's suggestion that foreign companies
avoid the new restrictions by partnering with Brazilian entities).
148. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (suggesting that having a domestic
partner's natLe on the contract allows the partnership to capitalize on domestic law
benefits).
149. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text (discussing the ramifications of
a joint venture agreement).
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situation, and this option does not go far enough to secure
investors' interests and meet their goals.15°
On a broader scale, the international community has begun
developing codes of conduct to govern international
transactions in rural lands. 151 These codes consider the
economic, social, and environmental impact of any given
international land deal.1 2 Although they are well intentioned,
relying on them to govern commercial land transactions in
Brazil has two major weaknesses. First, they are heavily skewed
toward protecting access to resources and maintaining a local
way of life in the host country and do not address stability for
investors. 153 Second, and more importantly, these codes are
closer to a set of principles than a concrete means of
determining land allocation.154 In a country with established
property laws such as Brazil, a code would merely supplement,
rather than govern, any land transaction. An international code
may be helpful in guiding future legislation; however, as an
entity in its own right, an international code will not provide the
degree of clarity and legal stability Brazil needs in this area. The
most viable solution is for Brazil to construct new legislation that
ensures security and certainty for investors and sellers, while also
promoting bureaucratic transparency and accountability.
B. Establishing Transpareny: State-Backed vs. Private Actors
The AGU's 2010 opinion was largely the result of concerns
over national sovereignty and a lack of administrative
transparency. China's recent acquisition of large tracts of land in
Africa spurred concern in Brazil that a food-hungry, people-rich
150. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (highlighting that a partnership can
have limitations, including a requirement of profit sharing, and the firfeiture of one
partncrs titled interest in the land).
151. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (outlining the dilerent codes
of conduct the international community is creating).
152. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing the various eleincnts
that should be considered in an international code).
153. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (discussing how concern over
conditions in the host countries was the impetus behind drafting international codes).
154. See supra notes 62, 65 and accompanying text (identifying "best practices"
and certain general categories that should be considered in compiling an international
code).
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nation would acquire a large percentage of Brazil's landmass.1 55
However, the decision to react to these changing circumstances
by extending Law 5.709's restrictions to all foreign-controlled
Brazilian businesses was over-inclusive, as businesses
incorporated in Brazil were already governed by Brazilian law. 156
Political considerations may prompt the government to closely
regulate large acquisitions by sovereign-wealth funds or state
agencies; however, acquisitions by private actors do not trigger
the same concerns. A majority of the issues implicated in land
deals can be resolved with statutory transparency requirements
and contractual provisions in land agreements rather than by
leveling debilitating restrictions.
The government should begin by increasing transparency
in all foreign land deals in to eliminate confusion about the
parties involved and ascertain the scope and purpose of the land
project. 157 A mechanism must be created to obtain detailed
information about the identity of the contracting parties,
including any large sources of funding, government-backed aid,
and the amount of land involved.1 5 Setting a minimum land size
for the legislation to apply will allow for administrative
efficiency. 159 In order to deal with the increased administrative
input, the law ought to outline parameters for constructing a
well-organized registry system capable of recording and
categorizing the relevant land deals.6 Legislators can use the
registry system prescribed in Law 5.709 as a baseline and expand
it to require more detailed information on the parties involved
155. See supra notes 137-4l (discussing the emergence of sovereign wvealth funds
and Brazil's particular concern with China).
156. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text (analyzing the elfect of the
2010 opinion on Brazilian businesses): supra notes 71-76 (documenting the important
role of foreign investment and foreign businesses in the Brazilian economy).
157. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing how many of the large
land deals lack transparency, which makes it difficult to formulate accurate assessments
and address problems).
158. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing how it is sometimes
difficult to separate sovereign wealth funds from private investors).
159. See supra note 111 and accompanying text (pointing out that legislation
currently regulates areas over three modules).
160. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text (describing the tangible, yet
limited capabilities of the current reporting system).
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and the intended purpose for the land. 1 These details will give
the government a more accurate overview of the country's rural
land ownership.1 62
Through enhanced general transparency requirements, the
government can distinguish between deals involving sovereign
purchasers and private investors.13 This separation will allow for
a second level of legislation that addresses land deals on a more
individualized basis, depending on the nature of the contracting
parties. If the government determines that more control is
needed in deals with sovereign-wealth investors, new legislation
can require specific contractual provisions in future land
agreements with state-backed actors.1 4 Possible provisions could
include an outline of the specific nature of the operation,
contingencies should political relations between the two
countries deteriorate, steps to follow in case of a domestic food
crisis, and other specific concerns of the host country.
A number of general policy changes could also mitigate the
political complications of selling or leasing to another state.1 5
For instance, legislation could give preference to leasing over
sale and encourage legal title to remain with Brazilian citizens-
either through incentives for leasing or penalties for sales.'6
Alternatively, legislation could include more restrictive usage
limitations for state-backed transactions to ensure important
national interests are not being impinged. Moreover, the
Brazilian government could assure increased control over the
properties by limiting deals involving other states to leases rather
161. See supa notes 115-19 and accompanying text (outlining the reporting
procedures and information required under tire current law).
162. See supra notes 116. 117 and accompanying text (requiring parties provide
certain information to regional authorities upon conclusion of a land purchase).
163. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (highlighting tihe difficulties
involved in distinguishing between public and private investors).
164. See supra note 100 (articulating the benefits of outlining specific obligations
or restrictions in contract provisions).
165. See supra notes 137-41 and accompanying tcxt (identityng the Brazilian
government's concern over the increased presence of sovereign states and institutions
in the land market).
166. See supa notes 147-49 and accompanying tcxt (articulating the Brazilian
government's suggestion that ioreign entities enter into partnerships wvith Brazilian
partners, whereby the Brazilian partner's i name would be on thre lease or dced and
thereby rcnder the property legally under the control of a Brazilian national).
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than issuing title. 7 Currently, the same law governs leases and
purchases by foreign entities,lbs New legislation should consider
land leases separately from land purchases, because combining
the two restricts the options available to buyers and sellers and
prevents both parties from realizing potential opportunities.
In regard to private investors, the Brazilian government
should change the law to eliminate the size restrictions on
foreign acquisition of rural lands. Investors are drawn to Brazil
because the quantity of land available for development allows
them to benefit from economies of scale.' 1  Allowing large land
purchases will increase the flow of capital into the country and
allow the area to benefit from technology transfers and
increased production. Both the Brazilian government and the
international community recognize Brazil's need for foreign
capital in the agricultural sector, and it is important to design
legislation that will permit for these investor incentives. 170
Investors should also make sure to safeguard their
investments with contractual provisions of their own. To guard
against future changes in a host country's law, such as that
rendered in the 2010 AGU opinion, investors can negotiate for a
stabilization clause that freezes the laws applicable to the
agreement on a certain date. 17' This will ensure that both parties
know exactly which law will apply to the investment for its
duration. The risk of repercussions from a food shortage in
Brazil is a contingency that should also be dealt with in the land
contract itself.'72 Parties can negotiate for clauses that allow for
consideration of varying degrees of crop depletion in the host
167. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (positing that leases ofler more
flexibility and more control to the host countriy); see e.g., supra note 34 and
accompanying text (observing that seven countries require foreign entities to acquire
land solely through leases).
168. See sipra note 133 and accompanying text (emphasizing that Law 5.709
governs all foreign land acquisition-including both leases and purchases).
169. See supa note 36 and accompanying text (discussing how investors consider
econonies of scale before deciding to invest in either a short or long-trim venture).
170. See sp-ra note 16 and accompanying text (citing the international consensus
that private funding is necessary for the agricultural sector).
171. See supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing how a stabilization
clause protects an investor from unfavorable changes in the host country law).
172. See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text (describing the need for
considcration of Cont ractual export provisions).
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country-for instance, allowing the host country to buy back a
certain percentage of the crops at market price if domestic
production falls below a certain level17 .
The current law is outdated, unclear, and inefficient, and
new legislation is necessary that considers both the changing
profile of the international investor and the continued need for
investment. The law should focus on attracting and incentivizing
foreign capital and investment in the Brazilian agricultural
industry in such a way that stimulates growth of unproductive
areas, permits for efficient use of the land, and provides security
for investors. The more transparency and certainty in the land
deals, the greater Brazil's ability to attract high-caliber investors.
Although this Note focused on the international investment
aspect of land acquisition, there are other equally important
considerations involved in formulating an agricultural land law
that harnesses Brazil's potential as an agricultural super-power,
while protecting its sovereignty and the rights of its citizens. This
requires considering how other social and political factors will
interact with large-scale land investment, factors such as national
security, environmental repercussions, job preservation, land
distribution and potential agrarian reform, and domestic food
policy. '174 Creating a law that values transparency and a
willingness to engage with new investors, while assuring a level of
stability and long-term benefit for the rural population, will
create a more secure environment for investment and allow the
Brazilian govermnent to utilize available global capital for the
development of a more extensive and efficient agricultural
industry.
CONCL USION
The growing importance of the agricultural industry in
meeting future food needs makes restrictive land-acquisition
173. Seespra notes 10 1-03 (discussing various contractual provisions important
for land agreements, including clauses governing the regulation of exports).
174. See DANIEL & MITTAL, supra note 11, at I 1-17 (exploring the potential
negative consequences of large land acquisitions, including the impact on small
farmers, land retorm. and local food access); see also Barrionuevo, supra note 48
(examining Brazilian officials' concerns over an increasing Chinese presence in areas
of Brazilian trade and land acquisition).
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laws, like the one created by the AGU's 2010 opinion,
antiquated and dangerous for prospective industry growth. Law
5.709 was written during a protectionist, military regime. Brazil
is now a democratic state, open to private and foreign capital,
and on the path to becoming a global power. The blatant and
preferential distinction created between national and foreign
capital in Law 5.709, and revived in the AGU's 2010 opinion,
does not align with the trajectory of Brazilian policy, nor does it
work to incentivize or retain investment. In light of these
considerations, Law 5.709 should be repealed and replaced with
new legislation to govern foreign rural land acquisition and
leasing.
The new legislation should include heightened
documentation and transparency requirements, eliminate size
caps, ensure the security of investments, address national
security issues, and contemplate contractual default provisions.
These legislative and contractual steps will ensure protection
and stability for investors as well as clarity and greater
opportunity for sellers. Moreover, new legislation will provide
Brazil with a stronger framework to facilitate and monitor
agribusiness and eventually realize the full potential of its
agricultural resources.
